Philosophy Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
| |||
|
| |||
| Arrow’s theorem: The Arrow theorem, established by Kenneth Arrow in 1951, shows that it is impossible to create a voting system that fulfills all desirable criteria simultaneously. It shows that no voting method can avoid paradoxes and ensure fairness, transitivity and independence from irrelevant alternatives in all situations, which has implications for political decision-making and social choice theory. See also Social choice theory._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
| Author | Concept | Summary/Quotes | Sources |
|---|---|---|---|
|
Public Choice Theory on Arrow’s Theorem - Dictionary of Arguments
Parisi I 186 Arrow’s theorem/Public choice theory/Farber: Arrow's Theorem provides a (…) rigorous proof that cycling is impossible to avoid in an even wider set of decision methods.* Cf. >Jury theorem/Public choice theory. Arrow's Theorem and its progeny identify intrinsic limitations on group decision-making that stem from the existence of diverse preferences rather than from any human failing. Thus, the paradox of majority rule, where shifting majorities can produce cycles, is not merely a defect of one particular voting method but is a general characteristic of group decisions. But there are exceptions where the premises of these theorems do not hold, and these exceptions are of critical importance in designing political institutions. Symmetry/asymmetry: We can see that escaping from cycling requires somehow either breaking the symmetry between the various options in our earlier example or else limiting voter preferences so that this kind of symmetrical situation is avoided. This could happen in various ways: (1) some options might get special weight when they are held by particular voters; (2) an agenda might favor one of the options even though it would lose against another option if they ever came up for a vote together; (3) we might go beyond the rankings of each voter by adding information such as the intensity of voter preference; or (4) voter preferences may be asymmetrical—for example, the same option might be everyone's second choice. Essentially, these are all the available techniques for escaping Arrow's Theorem. The first way to break the symmetry between the options is to exclude symmetrical preferences from consideration. Most notably, it is possible to have coherent decision-making when everyone agrees that the choices can be arrayed on a single metric, with each voter preferring the option that is closest to her ideal outcome over those that are further way. Then the preferences are no longer symmetrical because voters agree that some alternatives are more extreme than Parisi I 187 others.** If preferences are single-dimensional, majority voting is the solution to the problem of producing coherent, stable outcomes. >Decision-making/Public choice theory. * Arrow includes choices involving more than two options, and uses the axiom of Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives to show that avoidance of cycling not only requires a violation of anonymity but also implies that one voter must be a dictator whose preferences always control (Arrow, 1951)(1). ** This can be generalized to the "value restriction" condition that for every alternative under consideration, every member of the group can agree that a given option is not worst, not best, or not in the middle (Shepsle, 2010(2), p. 84). 1. Arrow, K. J. (1951). social Choice and Individual values. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. 2. Shepsle, K. A. (2010). Analyzing Politics: Rationality, Behavior, and Institutions. 2nd edition. New York: W.W. Norton & co. Farber, Daniel A. “Public Choice Theory and Legal Institutions”. In: Parisi, Francesco (ed) (2017). The Oxford Handbook of Law and Economics. Vol 1: Methodology and Concepts. NY: Oxford University Press_____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Public Choice Theory Parisi I Francesco Parisi (Ed) The Oxford Handbook of Law and Economics: Volume 1: Methodology and Concepts New York 2017 |
||
> Counter arguments against Public Choice Theory
> Counter arguments in relation to Arrow’s Theorem
Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2024-04-27